LOS CONTENEDORES CUMPLEN 50 AÑOShttp://www.marinacivil.com/articulos/articulo.asp?ida=2438Container Ships
A container is an internationally standardised packing box for cargo in which goods can be safely stowed away, stored and transported. It is designed for the most efficient use of space and for any type of transportation, be it by road, rail or sea. The different sizes of container have been fixed by the International Organization of Standardization (ISO). The twenty-feet container is the basic unit, length 20 feet, width 8 feet, height 8 feet 6 inches. It can be loaded with 15 to 20 tons of cargo. The abbreviation TEU means Twenty-feet Equivalent Units. The other size is the forty-feet container, Forty-feet Equivalent Unit (FEU) and can be loaded with up to 30 tons of cargo.
The width and height of the container is about 2.5 metres. The ship dimensions, such as the ship breadth, therefore depend on the number of containers placed abreast on deck and in the holds. Thus, one extra container box abreast in a given ship design involves an increased ship breadth of about 2.8 meters. The average loaded container weighs about 10-12 tons but, of course, this may vary, so the modern container vessels are dimensioned for 12-14 dwt per teu.
The use of containers started during the Second World War, but the history of container ships began in 1956, when the first container service was opened between the USA and Puerto Rico. Malcom McLean, a trucking entrepreneur from North Carolina, acquired a steamship company in 1955 with the idea of using its ships to transport cargo-laden truck trailers. McLean´s experiment resulted in the world´s first container ship, the Ideal-X, a converted oil tanker whose deck had been strengthened to accommodate containers. It made its inaugural voyage from New Jersey to Texas on 26 April 1956 with 58 trailers (containers) on its deck. The pioneering container ships could carry only 59 containers having a length of 35 feet and stacked two-high on deck. McLean´s enterprise became Sea-Land Services, an international shipping company. Container operators invested quite a bit in new technology. Sea-Land was the leader and they provided a great labor pool for the other shipping lines, like American President Lines.
Once this seemingly radical idea of carrying boxes by ship had been proven sufficiently in the coastwise trade, the first true container ships, having cellular holds into which containers were loaded by cranes came into being. Their capacity was around 200 TEU – the designation “TEU” (for twenty-foot equivalent units) being the standard measure of capacity adopted by the industry. The first ship specifically designed for container transportation appeared in 1960, viz. the Supanya, of 610 teu. The first vessel loaded with containers docked at an European port in 1966, also from the US.
The reason for the success of the container ship is that containerised shipping is a rational way of transporting most manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. This rational way of handling the goods is one of the fundamental reasons for the globalisation of production. Containerisation has therefore led to an increased demand for transportation and, thus, for further containerisation. A traditional / conventional vessel required between 8 to 10 days to load or unload 10,000 tons of general cargo. A containership can handle the same volume in 2 days within Europe and in 3 or 4 days on other continents.
The development in the container market was slow until 1968, in which year deliveries reached 18 such vessels. Ten of these 18 ships had a capacity of 1,000-1,500 teu. In 1969, 25 ships were delivered, and the size of the largest ships increased to 1,500-2,000 teu. In 1972, the first container ships with a capacity of more than 3,000 teu were delivered from the German Howaldtwerke Shipyard. Containers go to War
Containerized shipment of ammunition was tested during 1970 to support the Vietnam War. Some 226 containers were loaded with military explosives at four inland production plants and one depot. The containers were moved by highway to the Naval Weapons Station at Concord, California, where they were loaded aboard a crane-equipped container ship, transported to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, offloaded, and moved by a combination of coastal vessel and highway to Ban Me Thuot, Qui Nhon, Pleiku, and Landing Zone ENGLISH. No intermediate handling of the ammunition was required between the production plant and the Vietnam destination.
Participating in this test were the Army Materiel Command and the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service. Because the test was a one-time operation to be completed at an early date, certain adverse features were unavoidable. For example, moving loaded containers to the west coast by road instead of rail increased land movement costs considerably. The combination of a large container and a 75-percent safety limit on the lifting crane resulted in a low cube utilization of the container. Blocking and bracing standards imposed by the U.S. Coast Guard resulted in a complex blocking arrangement that was costly to install and remove and added significantly to gross weight. Furthermore, the one-time test did not allow negotiators to offer continuing shipments to highway and ocean carriers, which meant higher costs for one-time transportation.
Operationally the test demonstrated that real benefits could be attained through the shipment of containerized ammunition. Vessel turnaround was improved by 500 percent over break-bulk handling. Manpower efficiency was increased by 600 percent. These improvements promise a significant increase in the port throughput (berth and anchor discharge, onward movement, destination reception) capacity over that achieved in break-bulk handling. Increased manpower work loads at points of origin and destination were more than offset by over-all savings. The number of handlings was reduced from a possible eight by break-bulk to only two. The ammunition was in better condition on delivery, and lot integrity was preserved. The reduction in pipeline time would foster pipeline inventory savings when containerized shipments were routine. As fiscal year 1970 closed, actions were being taken to develop a total system for the containerized shipment of ammunition.
Sealift remained a critical consideration in Army planning and operations. Economic factors had compelled the civilian maritime industry to convert merchant ships from a break-bulk to a container fleet. The Military Sealift Command predicted that there would not be enough break-bulk dry cargo ships after 1972 to meet Department of Defense cargo requirements. Since the Army must rely upon the commercial maritime industry to transport the bulk of its cargo, it was imperative that the Army logistics system be compatible with the civilian maritime industry. Experience in Vietnam revealed that containerization offers a potential means for reducing logistical cost and improving the responsiveness of the logistical system in both peacetime and wartime. The Department of Defense had been using commercial container services to distribute a significant portion of its materiel to locations worldwide. But by the early 1970s military facilities, equipment, concepts, and doctrine were inadequate and incompatible with the newly developed commercial container system, and the Army´s logistical capability in the 1972-1982 decade would be impaired unless the potential of the commercial industry is capitalized upon.
Within the Department of Defense a steering group comprised of service representatives was established in September 1971 to coordinate surface and air container systems development and provide systems managers with guidance and direction. A Department of Defense project manager´s office was established, jointly staffed, to handle surface container-supported distribution systems development, and located with the Commander of the Army Materiel Command. This office prepared and the services approved a master plan that addressed funding, equipment, research, and evaluation. In addition, improvements in the container chassis (MILVANS) were under study to improve surface mobility. PanaMax
The delivery in 1980 of the 4,100 teu Neptune Garnet was the largest container ship to date. Deliveries had now reached a level of 60-70 ships per year and, with some minor fluctuations, it stayed at this level until 1994, which saw the delivery of 143 ships. With the American New York, delivered in 1984, container ship size passed 4,600 teu. For the next 12 years, the max. container ship size was 4,500-5,000 teu (mainly because of the limitation on breadth and length imposed by the Panama Canal). The hull dimensions of the largest container ships, the so-called Panamax-size vessels, were limited by the length and breadth of the lock chambers of the Panama Canal, i.e. a max. ship breadth (beam) of 32.3 m, a max. overall ship length of 294.1 m (965 ft), and a max. draught of 12.0 m (39.5 ft). Panama Canal lock chambers are 305 m long and 33.5 m wide, and the largest depth of the canal is 12.5-13.7 m. The canal is about 86 km long, and passage takes eight hours.
The corresponding cargo capacity was between 4,500 and 5,000 teu. These maximum ship dimensions are also valid for passenger ships, but for other ships the maximum length is 289.6 m (950 ft). However, it should be noted that, for example, for bulk carriers and tankers, the term Panamax-size is defined as 32.2/32.3 m (106 ft) breadth, 228.6 m (750 ft) overall length, and no more than 12.0 m (39.5 ft) draught. The reason for the smaller length used for these ship types is that a large part of the world´s harbors and corresponding facilities are based on this length. At present the canal has two lanes, but a possible third lane with an increased lock chamber size is under consideration in order to capture the next generation of container ships of up to about 12,000 teu.
Several maritime incidents during the early 1990´s underscored the risk of serious injury or death, vessel loss, property damage, and environmental damage caused by improperly secured cargo aboard vessels. The most well-known incident occurred off the New Jersey coast in early 1992. During a voyage in bad weather, the M/V Santa Clara I lost 21 containers overboard, including 4 containers of the hazardous material, arsenic trioxide.
The Coast Guard convened a Board of Inquiry to investigate the M/V Santa Clara I mishap. The Board found that the container losses were caused by cargo securing failures related to bad weather and human error. Based on its findings, the Board recommended adopting the International Maritime Organization´s (IMO) voluntary guidelines on cargo securing manuals as regulations in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS). The Commandant approved the Board´s recommendation. With the support of other IMO member governments, the U.S. led a proposal to include new requirements for cargo securing manuals in SOLAS. These requirements were adopted as part of the 1994 amendments to SOLAS. These requirements are located in SOLAS Chapters VI/5.6 and VII/6.6.
Under SOLAS, all cargo vessels engaged on international voyages and equipped with cargo securing systems or individual securing arrangements must have a Flag State approved Cargo Securing Manual (CSM) by December 31, 1997. Under SOLAS and Executive Order 12234 -- which authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations that implement SOLAS--these requirements for a cargo securing manual apply to all U.S.-flag cargo vessels of 500 gross tons or more, engaged in international trade. Vessel types affected include general-cargo vessels, cellular containerships, roll-on/roll-off vessels, passenger/cargo vessels, supply vessels, bulk vessels capable of carrying non-bulk cargo, heavy lift ships, freight ships carrying packaged or break-bulk cargoes, and other similar vessels. Post-PanaMax
APL developed a new transportation net without using the Panama channel. This marked the creation of the new ´Post-Panmax´ type. In 1996 the Regina Mærsk exceeded this limit, with an official capacity of 6,400 teu, and started a new development in the container ship market. Since 1996, the maximum size of container ships has rapidly increased from 6,600 teu in 1997 to 7,200 teu in 1998, and up to 8,700 teu in ships delivered in 1999. The vessels delivered or on order with a capacity of approx. 9,000 teu have exceeded the Panamax beam by approx. 10 m. The development of the post-panamax fleet has been dramatic; today 30% of the world´s fleet, by capacity, is post-panamax
From the carrier perspective, the primary appeal of the mega ship is operating economy of scale. The operating cost of a 6,000 TEU vessel is not proportionally higher than that of a 4,000 TEU ship. However, viewed in terms of their impact on the larger transportation system, such vessels may actually impose higher costs. Problems with the Super Post-Panamax class of ship include the massive surge of containers discharged in a single port call; the challenge inherent in trying to fill a very large ship with cargo on a repetitive basis; and the expense involved in providing sufficient channel and berth depth, terminal area, gantry cranes of adequate size, and other items of equipment and infrastructure. Despite these concerns, over 50 orders for ships in this class were placed with shipyards in 1999 alone.
By 2000 the global container ship fleet numbered over 6,800 vessels. Over 71 percent of these are fully cellular, meaning they are "purpose-built" to carry ocean containers in specially constructed vertical slots. The capacity of this fleet was over 5.8 million Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units, or TEUs. While nearly three-quarters of the fleet by number consists of relatively small ships (specifically, those of under 1,000 TEU capacity), the "mega ship," or Super Post-Panamax vessel of 4,500 TEU and larger, is growing rapidly in prominence. By the end of 2001, about 10% of the global box ship fleet by capacity consisted of Super Post-Panamax ships.
At the beginning of the year 2004 there were already about 100 container ships with a capacity of 8,000 TEU in use. The Samsung shipyard builds a container ship with a capacity of 9.200 TEU, commissioning in 2005. Samsung delivered a 9,600 TEU ship in 2006. The increase in the maximum size of container ships does not mean that the demand for small feeder and coastal container ships has decreased. Ships with capacities of less than 2,000 teu account for more than 50% of the number of ships delivered in the last decade. Container ships compete with conventional reefer ships and, when it was delivered in 1996, the Regina Mærsk was the ship with the largest reefer capacity, with plugs for more than 700 reefer containers. There is almost no limit to the type of commodities that can be transported in a container and/or a container ship. This is one of the reasons why the container ship market is expected to grow faster than world trade and the economy in general. Some car manufacturers have already containerised the transport of new cars, and other car manufacturers are testing the potential for transporting up to four family cars in a 45-foot container.
All in all, the demand for transport capacity increases by 7-8% per year, and there is a fine balance between the yards´ order books for container ships for delivery in 2001 and 2002, and the expected increase in the market (total 210 ships ~750,000 teu), i.e. no scrapping is envisaged. In total, the number of container ships delivered increased from 150 a year in 1994-1995 to 250 in 1998. As a consequence of the financial crises in the industrialised East Asian countries, deliveries decreased to 114 ships in 1999 and 115 in 2000. This shows how important the East Asian region is to the container ship market.
One train is physically limited to 240 40-foot containers. Therefore, about 10 double-stack trains would have to be arranged to move the inbound containers from one such 9000 TEU ship. Those problems can be solved through infrastructure improvement. Container vessels in the size range of 400-3,000 teu still hold a very important part of the freight market.
The larger the container ship, the more time is required for loading and unloading and, as the time schedule for a container ship is very tight, the extra time needed for loading/unloading means that, in general, larger container ships may have to sail at a proportionately higher service speed. The increase in ship size has been followed by a corresponding demand for higher design ship speeds. For ships in the size range of up to 1,500 teu, the speed is between 9 and 25 knots, with the majority of the ships (58%) sailing at some 15-19 knots. The most popular speed for the 1,500-2,500 teu ships is 18-21 knots, which applies to 70% of these ships. In the 2,500-4,000 teu range, 90% of the ships have a speed of 20-24 knots. 71% of the 4,000-6,000 teu ships have a speed of 23-25 knots. Finally, 80% of the ships that are larger than 6,000 teu have a speed of 24-26 knots. For the future ultra large container ships, a ship speed of 25-26 knots may be expected, whereas a higher ship speed would involve a disproportionately high fuel consumption.
In February 2005 it was announced that Lloyd´s Register was to class the world´s largest declared capacity container ships – four 10,000 teu vessels, to be built in Korea at Hyundai Heavy Industries for China Ocean Shipping Corporation (Cosco). The vessels will be delivered between late 2007 and mid-2008. Each of the ships will have a length overall of 349 meters, a breadth of 45.6 meters and a depth of 27.2 meters. Each ship will be fitted with a 12-cylinder 94,000 horsepower engine to enable a trading speed of 25.8 knots.
Lloyd´s Register has an established track record of classing large container ships, including a series of 8,500 teu ships recently completed by Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) for Canadian, Chinese and Greek owners. Other orders for large container ships to Lloyd´s Register class include 9,200 and 9,600 teu ships at SHI, 8,400 teu ships at Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, 7,030 teu ships at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and 6,400 teu ships at Hanjin Heavy Industries. The 10,000 teu container ships ordered by Cosco are the next step towards the 12,500 teu limit. Suez-Max Ultra Large Container Ships (ULCS)
The Suez Canal canal is about 163 km long and 80-135 m wide, and has no lock chambers. Most of the canal has only a single traffic lane with several passing bays. It is intended to increase the depth of the canal before 2010 in order to capture the largest container ships to be built.
Suez-max investigations showed that in future, perhaps by 2010, Ultra Large Container Ships (ULCS) carrying some 12,000 teu containers can be expected. This ship size, with a breadth of 50 m / 57 m, and corresponding max. draught of 16.4 m / 14.4 m, may just meet the present Suezmax size.
For these very large vessels of the future, the propulsion power requirement may be up to about 100 MW/136,000 bhp. Investigations conducted by a propeller maker show that propellers can be built to absorb such high powers. Single-screw vessels are therefore still being considered, along with twin-skeg vessels (with two main engines and two propellers).
The ultra-large container ship (ULCS) study was initiated by Lloyd´s Register, in association with Ocean Shipping Consultants Ltd, in 1999. The study commissioned by Lloyd´s Register concluded that ultra-large container ships of up to 12,500 teu are entirely feasible and that the first of these vessels may be in service by 2010. The larger ships offer reduced cost, even taking into account the additional time spent in port. The calculations have been carried out on the assumption that a trading speed of 25 knots will be required across this entire range of ship sizes. This necessitates a twin-engine installation for ships of 10,000 teu and above. For the 18,000 teu container ship one might assume that an overall length of 470 m will be possible, assuming that the problem with the hull strength will be solved. This will reduce the ship draught and enable more harbors to handle such a large container ship.
Beyond 12,500 teu it is expected that container ship and container terminal design will have to undergo significant change. For container ships, this might include the addition of a second screw, with the added capital investment that this entails. The industry will probably see the first 12,500 teu ship ordered before 2010.
In September 2005 an innovative design study for a 13,000 TEU container ship was presented by Germanischer Lloyd and the Korean yard Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI). The new ship design with two main engines and two propellers. All the relevant calculations have been carried out and the design completely approved by Germanischer Lloyd; the Korean yard is now accepting orders. The ship is 382 metres long and 54.2 metres wide, and has a draft of 13.5 m. The 6,230 containers below deck are stacked in 10 tiers and 19 rows, while the 7,210 deck containers are stowed in 21 rows. Powered by two 45,000 kW engines, the vessel´s speed is 25.5 knots. The design study is characterized by two technical innovations: the cooperation partners decided on a twin drive configuration and the separation of deckhouse and engine room.
The question as to what propulsion powers and arrangements are needed to achieve the desired speed of 26 knots may be answered by diverse technical approaches: in the early phase of detailed calculations, not only the twin drive, but also the possibilities offered by one main engine, as well as one main engine with an additional pod drive, were considered. The cost estimate for the various drive configurations, never before done by a shipyard, indicated that a twin propulsion system was only negligibly more cost-intensive than the variant with only one main engine.
From the technical standpoint, the aspect of absolute safety is a major argument for the twin drive. In the event of an engine failure, the ship would remain manoeuvrable and could reach a safe harbour under its own steam. The main-engine and shaft sizes correspond to those of a 4,000 TEU carrier. More than 15 years of experience and smooth operation speak in favour of this size of propulsion unit. Engines and propellers of this size are in widespread use, making the maintenance and procurement of spare parts both easy and cost-effective.
On the other hand, the single-engine variant leads to several difficulties that have not been solved as yet. The output of a 14-cylinder engine is not enough to achieve the required speed, whereas a 16-cylinder engine would be too large. As regards propeller size, HHI believes that the maximum has been reached with a diameter of 9.5 m and a weight of 110 t. What is more, the single-screw design involves a great risk of cavitation; the extremely high shaft power also represents a hazard.
With a view to meeting the SOLAS requirements for bridge visibility on such a large ship, the design envisages the separation of deckhouse and engine room. The innovative arrangement of the deckhouse in the forward part of the ship permits an increase in container capacity and a reduction in ballast water. The international regulations on the protection of fuel tanks are also satisfied with this design, because they are located in the protected area below the deckhouse. Another welcome result of this innovation is reduced bending and increased stiffness of the hull.
Over a period of one and a half years, the cooperation partners Germanischer Lloyd and Hyundai Heavy Industries performed calculations for all components of the ship. The study investigated the layout of the ship, the number of containers and their stowage, the design of the fuel tanks, and also provided for strength analyses. Further aspects included slamming calculations, propulsion plants, engine room design and vibration analyses. In addition to towing experiments, tank model tests were also carried out at Hyundai in respect of parametric rolling, with the support of Germanischer Lloyd. At the same time, programs developed by Germanischer Lloyd were used to examine the behaviour of the ship in a seaway, especially parametric rolling. Moreover, exhaust emission tests were conducted to determine the optimum position for the funnels.
The production period for such a ship lies at 9 to 10 months. Owing to the great workload of the yard, delivery before 2009 will not be possible.
Many ports in America simply couldn´t accommodate such vessels, except at great expense. And ports are differently endowed through the vagaries of geography or geology. Gulfport, Mississippi, for example, has about 36 feet of draft. New Orleans has about 40 feet, with all that sediment coming down the Mississippi. The Seattle approach channel, on the other hand, was glacier-carved; it averages 175 feet. Halifax, Nova Scotia, averages about 60 feet, Baltimore and Hampton Roads average about 50 feet, while New York/New Jersey presently averages 40 to 45 feet.
Thus, some U.S. ports will have an easier time of it when accommodating megaships, with the consequent potential for some reshuffling of rank among various North American ports. This would be very similar to another change that happened 40 years ago during the advent of containerization. Some people could make it--some people couldn´t make it. San Francisco decided it didn´t have the room to pursue containerization. It became a tourist waterfront and gave all of its cargo up to Oakland. Manhattan decided that it couldn´t do it and gave it all to New Jersey. Post-Suez-Max
Post-Suez-max nvestigations indicate that in about 10 years the ULCS will perhaps be as big as 18,000 teu, with a ship breadth of 60 m and a maximum draft of 21 m. Today, this ship size would be classified as a post-Suezmax ship, as the cross-section of the ship is too big for the present Suez Canal. It is claimed that the transportation cost per container for such a big ship may be about 30% lower than that of a typical 5,000-6,000 teu container vessel of today.Post-Malacca-Max
Malacca-max relfects the fact that a draft of 21 m is the maximum permissible draught through the Malacca Strait.
With the intended increase of the cross-section breadth and depth of the Suez Canal over the coming ten years, the 18,000 teu container ship will also be able to pass the Suez Canal. On the other hand, a future container ship with a draft of 21 m would require existing harbors to be dredged. Today, only the harbors of Singapore and Rotterdam are deep enough.